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State–Society Relations and 
the Dilemmas of the New 
Developmentalist State
Evelina Dagnino
Abstract In confronting neoliberal models and their emphasis on state–
market alliances, new developmentalism has emerged as a powerful 
alternative, received with enthusiasm by progressive forces. It has certainly 
been responsible for unquestionable advances in fighting inequalities, 
particularly in Latin America where it has been adopted by leftist 
governments from 2000 on. However, it has been unable to redefine the 
old formula of a ‘strong, self-sufficient state’ and the centralising political 
practices characteristic of the ‘old’ developmentalism. Therefore, the article 
argues that the new developmental state has ended up by draining the 
potential of participatory democracy, which had brought together hopes 
for inclusive and sustainable development policies and had announced a 
new alliance between state and society through which rights could be 
ensured and democracy deepened.
Keywords: new developmentalist state, participatory democracy, 
Latin America, leftist governments. 
1 Introduction
The new developmentalist state has been received with enthusiasm 
as an alternative to neoliberal models and their emphasis on state–
market alliances. Whereas it has been responsible for unquestionable 
advances in fighting inequalities, particularly in Latin America where 
it has been adopted by leftist governments from 2000 on, I argue that 
the integration of  social participation in its decision-making processes 
and the building of  a new balance between state and society has faced 
significant limits. Centralising political practices characteristic of  the 
‘old’ developmentalism resist confronting the alleged ‘novelty’ of  the 
new model, and drain the potential of  participatory democracy, which 
had brought together hopes for inclusive and sustainable development 
policies, and had announced a new alliance between state and society 
through which rights could be ensured and democracy deepened. 
This article will first discuss the trajectory of  participatory democracy 
and the limits and difficulties it has faced; it will then examine the 
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emergence of  leftist governments in the continent, and will conclude by 
arguing that their adoption of  a new developmental conception of  the 
state has undermined the participation of  society in sharing decisions 
concerning development directions.
2 The institutional participation of civil society: promises of a new 
relation between state and society
During at least the last two decades, the institutional participation 
of  civil society1 became largely accepted in many parts of  the world 
as a principle to ensure the deepening of  democratic construction. 
In Latin America, between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, new 
constitutions in 19 countries included some provision for citizen 
participation, 17 of  them incorporated mechanisms of  direct political 
participation, and 14 provided for public spaces with both state and civil 
society representation (Hevia 2006).
Obviously, the meanings and intentions as well as the practices of  these 
provisions vary. Different conceptions of  social participation and social 
control of  the state have been in dispute, according to different existing 
political projects (Dagnino 2004; Dagnino et al. 2006). From more radical 
views such as participation as ‘sharing power’ to notions of  participation 
as a tool to provide information and increase the state’s efficiency, or 
even as a mere rhetorical instrument for electoral purposes, a quite 
diverse set of  meanings has been attributed to the term by different 
political forces, with equally different practical political implications.2
Brazil is frequently pointed out as the country with the largest and most 
advanced experiments in participatory democracy. The creation of  the 
Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in 1980, with its original 
strong commitment to social participation, was a central element in the 
gradual establishment of  what came to be referred to as the ‘architecture 
of  participation’ (Dagnino and Teixeira 2014). It began with the well-
known Participatory Budget created in 1989 in Porto Alegre, under 
the government of  the Workers’ Party, which became a model that was 
internationally praised, including by the World Bank. This ‘architecture’ 
comprises public policy management councils and conferences, 
established at municipal, state and national levels, involving millions of  
people to discuss public policies in several policy areas such as education, 
health, social services, children and adolescents, women, the environment, 
food security, racial equality, culture, etc. as well as a myriad of  other 
participatory mechanisms. It is worth mentioning, however, that central 
economic policies have remained immune to civil society participation.
Participatory experiments spread throughout Latin America3 in varied 
formats and travelled to many parts of  the world. Although they 
became the focus of  attention and, in countries like Brazil, had heavily 
concentrated the efforts of  social movements, given their novelty and 
the potential they represented, they did not exhaust all other modalities 
of  social participation, such as protests and other forms of  pressure 
towards the state.
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Bringing together representatives of  both state and civil society to discuss 
and deliberate about public policies in several areas, these institutions have 
been seen as new models for the relations between them. They can be considered 
new at least in two aspects: they opened space for excluded voices, 
including and mainly from popular sectors, to be heard, as compared 
to the previous monopoly of  access to decisions by dominant sectors. In 
addition, they intended to provide channels of  representation additional to 
representative electoral democracy, the traditional and dominant formula 
for relations between state and society. The already age-old – and now 
aggravated – ‘crisis of  representation’ was already present in that intention.
To what extent these institutions have been effective, their successes and 
failures, is a question that has already produced a vast literature, which 
shows largely mixed results from hundreds of  case studies throughout 
the continent. After a first wave of  enthusiasm and praise, more recent 
studies present much more nuanced and critical views, emphasising the 
limits and difficulties faced by participatory democracy.
The formats of  participatory experiments, their degrees of  formalisation, 
scope and resources, their either consulting or decision-making character, 
as well as their permanence, vary very much throughout the continent. 
Their effectiveness also varies and is deeply affected by many factors. 
These should be mentioned in order to make clear that there are 
multiple sources of  limits and difficulties faced by such experiments: the 
specific political contexts in which deliberation takes place, the political 
forces involved and the power correlation between them, and how 
conflictive are the interests at stake. Furthermore, the commitment and 
qualification of  state representatives, the organisational density of  the 
sectors of  civil society that are represented, the technical and political 
qualifications of  civil society’s representatives, and most importantly the 
frequently scarce resources available for policy implementation, are all 
relevant elements bearing on the effectiveness of  participatory spaces.
For civil society itself, institutional participation also brought mixed 
consequences. On the one hand, it required the acquisition of  new 
capacities, very different from the usual repertoires of  collective 
action; a demanding learning process, which tended to encourage a 
‘professionalisation’ of  civil society representatives. This aggravated 
the proliferation of  non-governmental organisations (NGOs), already 
under way under the neoliberal model, in which they had been 
selected as the reliable, loyal, non-conflictive interlocutors of  the 
state, especially in taking charge of  formerly public responsibilities. 
The relationship between representatives and their social bases 
suffered from this professionalisation as social mobilisation and 
political organisation tended to take second place. On the other hand, 
more positively, representatives have been able to learn the modes 
of  state operation, improve their negotiation and deliberation skills 
and extend their networking. Research has shown that, successes 
or failures notwithstanding, civil society representatives assess their 
participation in the Brazilian Policy Councils, for example, as positive 
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(Szwako 2012). On the negative side, more critical analyses point out 
the risks of  ‘co-optation’, instrumentalisation by political parties and 
clientelism emerging in this closer relationship with different political 
and economic actors.
Effectiveness, that is to say, the extent to which civil society representatives 
have impact on public policies formulated in participatory spaces, is 
very difficult to measure (Pires 2011), not least because results reflect so 
many different factors. However, despite the extremely unequal weight 
of  popular social sectors as compared to the market, participatory 
institutions did provide space for the building of  alliances between civil 
society and sectors of  the state, especially when similar political projects 
brought them together on specific issues (Dagnino 2002).
3 The emergence of leftist governments: promises renewed
This last assertion has been precisely what underlay the expectations 
of  progressive sectors of  civil society when, from the 2000s on, leftist 
governments emerged in Latin America. Social movements heavily 
supported these new governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela,4 renewing their hopes for the 
consolidation and expansion of  mechanisms of  participation of  civil 
society as well as of  democratising alliances with the state. These new 
forces occupying the state were seen as possibilities of  rupture with the 
neoliberal cycle that had increased inequalities, eliminated rights and 
taken to an extreme the alliance between state and markets.
Although this emergence of  leftist governments has been generalised 
as a ‘red’ or ‘pink’ tide, there are significant differences between them. 
Participatory experiments, in spite of  their continental and even global 
diffusion and adoption by different political forces, have traditionally 
been associated with the left. However, the emphasis they have received 
within the new governments has varied. In some cases, new mechanisms 
have been created (Uruguay and Venezuela); in others, existing 
participatory institutions have been strengthened and/or extended 
from local to national levels; in others yet these institutions ‘have been 
relatively scarce’ (Argentina and Chile) (Goldfrank 2016: 5) or appear 
prominent in the new constitutions but not so much in practice (Bolivia 
and Ecuador).5 In Brazil, changes in the conception of  participation 
itself, from more radical views of  participation as sharing power to 
milder versions of  ‘consultation’ and ‘dialogue’ closer to neoliberal 
procedures, became evident along President Lula’s mandates (2003–10) 
(Dagnino and Teixeira 2014), whereas his successor, President Dilma 
Rousseff (2011–16), has been clearly insensitive to the issue. According 
to Boaventura de Souza Santos, a Portuguese scholar well known for his 
defence of  democratic deepening,
[T]he tools of  participatory democracy that were the hallmark 
of  popular government (participatory budgeting, sectorial policy 
councils, national conferences) have been worn down, losing the 
capacity for renovation, and above all, they were relegated more 
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and more to deciding over less and less important issues. The major 
investments and large public works projects were left out of  the reach 
of  participatory democracy (Souza Santos 2014).
How to explain this relative fading of  participatory democracy when 
expectations foresaw a different trajectory? In addition to the general 
factors influencing its effectiveness, a number of  specific reasons can be 
highlighted. The correlation of  forces vis-à-vis dominant conservative 
sectors, including members of  representative democracy who felt 
their power threatened,6 the priority given to so-called ‘governability’, 
and the different degrees of  commitment to participatory democracy 
amongst leftist forces themselves (Goldfrank 2016) may help to explain 
the declining progress. However, an often-neglected but central factor, 
I argue, lies in the reconfiguration of  the state undertaken by leftist 
governments under neo-developmentalism.
4 What is new about the new developmental state?
In spite of  their differences, what all those governments had in 
common was the adoption of  a proactive conception of  the role of  
the state towards development policies: even with different emphases 
and degrees of  consistency, the new developmentalist state re-emerged 
in Latin America in reaction to the central feature of  neoliberalism: 
a ‘reduced’ state, increasingly subordinated to the market. That 
conception of  the new developmentalist state, in a rather perverse 
manner, contributed to the declining trajectory of  participatory 
democracy and installed an alliance between state and society that did 
not favour the deepening of  democracy.
New developmentalism has been the object of  heated debate in Latin 
America, involving economists almost exclusively. Efforts to distinguish 
it from both the ‘old’ developmentalism and the neoliberal model it is 
supposed/intended to replace have been key in this debate. Differences 
and similarities or ruptures and continuities with respect to the latter 
have been emphasised, particularly about the relations between state and 
market, defined by the new approach as one of  ‘complementarity’, with 
reinforced regulatory capacities of  the state, and the explicit refusal of  
any interventionist or protectionist features. To critics that stressed the 
‘ambiguity’ of  the new model, Bresser Pereira,7 a Brazilian economist 
who is one of  its leading defenders, states: ‘[N]ew developmentalism is 
pragmatic’, it ‘desires a strong market and a strong state and doesn’t see 
any contradiction between the two’ (Bresser Pereira 2010: 26, 51).
There is no ambiguity, however, in the new developmentalism’s statement 
about its redistributive goals. And indeed, it has been responsible for 
unquestionable advances in fighting inequalities, significantly abandoning 
the neoliberal targeted/focused social policies and adopting more 
universalising ones, recognising the rights of  excluded groups such as of  
the poor, indigenous people, black minorities, women, homosexuals, etc. 
The Brazilian experience offers abundant examples of  these directions.
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Rather than discussing here the several economic dimensions in 
this debate, what I want to explore is the character of  the state in 
neo-developmentalism and the kind of  alliance between state and 
society that it represents. More interested in asserting the central rupture 
with neoliberalism, neo-developmentalists basically limit this specific 
discussion to the simple affirmation of  a protagonist ‘strong state’. 
Therefore, it is in their efforts to assert the distinction between new and 
old developmentalism (Bresser Pereira 2012) that we can find interesting 
clues with respect to the new developmental conception of  the state.
The ‘old’ developmentalist model, also known as national 
developmentalism, was first established in Latin America during the 
1930s and 1940s, with the governments of  Vargas in Brazil (1930–45 
and 1950–54), Perón in Argentina (1946–55 and 1973–74) and 
Cárdenas in Mexico (1934–40). In very different economic, political, 
social and international contexts, the need for a ‘strong state’, again, 
was its key feature. At its beginning, in the Brazilian experience, where 
the model continued to prevail, more in theory than in practice, until 
the military coup in 1964, it was intended to face two main tasks: 
the building of  the nation and of  the state itself. This assessment saw 
Brazil as plagued by regionalisms, fragmentation of  political parties 
(partidarismos) and particularisms that needed a strong unifying state, 
able not only to promote development but also ‘to organise’ society and 
build a proper nation. In the huge and dense theoretical production of  
the time, defenders of  national developmentalism considered the state 
as the ‘main agent of  social transformation’ (Dagnino 1986).
After a period of  limited democratic rule, the ‘strong state’ became an 
openly authoritarian regime, from 1937 to 1945. The installation of  
industrial capitalism and the organisation of  society along corporative 
lines, yet coupled with the delivery of  social rights and the recognition 
of  labour as a legitimate political interlocutor, even if  subordinated 
to the state, were the main results of  the first Vargas period,8 also 
recognised as establishing the beginnings of  populism.
Almost 80 years later, the discourse of  new developmentalism seems to 
bring back the same conceptions, strikingly repeating the same vocabulary: 
the ‘strong state is the par excellence instrument of  the nation’s collective 
action’, states Bresser Pereira (2010: 3). More explicitly, other authors, 
referring to a needed ‘certain degree of  decentralisation’ of  the state, add:
It should be noted, however, that this doesn’t mean that the most 
important decisions referring to public policies to be implemented 
should be equally decentralized, since governmental agents, 
democratically elected, should be responsible for their definition. 
(Sicsú, Paula and Michel 2007: 513, author’s translation from the 
Portuguese)
Here, representative democracy seems to be the only envisaged channel 
for participation.
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The meaning and the implications of  the characterisation of  the nature 
of  the developmental state are perhaps further clarified by what is absent 
in them: in the discourse of  its proponents there isn’t any reference 
to the role of  society’s participation in the formulation of  public 
policies, after, in the Brazilian case, more than 20 years of  accumulated 
experience. The reduction of  social participation to representative 
democracy through voting is very much linked to the recurrence of  a 
conception of  the state as an almighty, self-sufficient entity, still very 
much rooted in the Latin American political imaginary and adopted 
and promoted by leftist governments. Having been elected with the 
strong support of  social movements, leftist governments see themselves 
as legitimately representing the interests and claims of  excluded sectors 
of  society, given basically their distributive commitment – what they 
rightfully were to a significant extent. Capitalising on their social policies 
of  recognition and distribution, there has been a gradual increasing 
closure of  decision-making in the state. The new alliance between 
state and excluded sectors of  society, announced by the experiments in 
participatory democracy, and based on sharing power and on the social 
control of  the state, has gradually assumed a limited character.
Instead, traits of  the old paternalistic alliance have showed their 
resilience. Strong charismatic leaders have transferred their legitimacy 
to a progressively self-contained state, a mechanism whose initial 
effectiveness has tended to erode as contradictions between state policies 
and social movements’ demands have become increasingly evident. As 
Gallegos states about Ecuador, ‘the articulation between decisionismo 
and new developmentalism didn’t seem favourable to the effective 
participation of  a wider sector of  social actors in the conduction of  the 
transformation process’ (Gallegos 2008: 195).
References to the ‘nation’ also resonate with old developmentalism. The 
Patria Bolivariana of  Hugo Chávez, Garcia Linera’s Bolivian Nation and 
Rousseff’s Patria Educadora indicate attempts to formulate a national 
identity from above, where the state – and not society – defines and 
incarnates the ‘nation’. The return to these conceptions maintains an 
odd relationship, to say the least, to the primacy of  social participation 
asserted in official discourse, as well as, in some cases, to the recognition 
of  pluri-culturalism (Rivera Cusicanqui 2014).
Other perverse implications followed from a conception of  the state that 
sees itself  as the ‘fundamental agent of  transformation’. The tendency 
to replace their original political projects with ‘power projects’ is visible 
in the present decline of  leftist governments. Holding state power and 
particularly remaining in power at any cost (and costs may include 
corruption and authoritarian measures, as well as all kinds of  alliances 
and concessions in order to ensure so-called ‘governability’) seem to be 
justified in the name of  that cause.
The basic requirement of  neo-developmentalism, as put by its defenders, 
is ‘the primacy of  the role of  the state as a pro-development political 
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conscious action’ (Carneiro 2012: 776). There is no question that the 
definition of  such a protagonist role configured an encouraging premise 
towards the replacement of  the dominant neoliberal model. What is in 
question is how this premise has unfolded to constitute a real rupture, not 
only with neoliberal pillars but also with the statist conception of  politics 
(Lechner 1990) that has historically plagued Latin America.
Economic policies under neo-developmentalism showed clear limits 
in pointing towards a radically new model of  development. Based on 
growing processes of  financialization and on ‘extractive rent’, through 
the intensification of  mining and other extractive industries, including 
soy agriculture (Gago and Mezzadra 2015), the neo-developmental 
states have been particularly ambiguous with respect to their 
environmental policies. This is also one area, among others, where the 
participation of  civil society and social movements has been remarkably 
bypassed. In Brazil, the approval of  the Forest Code and the building 
of  the Belo Monte hydropower plant have been clear examples of  long 
and intense social mobilisation, ignored by the government. In spite of  
heavy protest, conflicting economic and environmental policies have led 
to devastating environmental consequences as in Bolivia and Ecuador. 
In these countries, as in others, initial progressive discourses gave way 
to contradictory practices, both with respect to citizen voice and to 
sustainability concerns.
Social movements and popular sectors have become increasingly critical 
of  governments’ actions. Resort to ‘direct action’ through protests, 
occupations and invasions have intensified as the negotiation practices 
made possible by the institutional channels of  participation show 
their paralysis and inefficiency. The initial support from those sectors, 
sustained by distributive and recognition policies, is at stake. The 
advance of  neoliberal forces in countries like Brazil and Argentina show 
a backward movement that can be explained by a number of  factors. 
However, the contradictions of  the developmental state format adopted 
by leftist governments with respect to the role of  people’s voice in that 
configuration are certainly part of  that explanation.
5 Conclusion
The ambiguities and contradictions of  neo-developmentalism in Latin 
America, which has culminated in defeats and a crisis of  the left, impose 
a sober political analysis. Among the various features that can help us to 
understand such a trajectory, I have focused on the features of  its self-
defined main agent, the ‘strong state’. I have argued that the dilemmatic 
paradox of  new developmentalism implemented by leftist governments 
lies in its very conception of  the state: while its new protagonist role 
could have represented new paths towards a more equal and sustainable 
development, it has implied the ‘downgrading’ of  participatory 
democracy and the confining of  participation to representative 
democracy. By relying on ‘old’ ways of  doing politics, reviving the 
traditional state monopoly of  decision-making and emphasising the role 
of  a deteriorated mode of  social representation, new developmentalism 
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has failed to fully incorporate what represented a crucial innovative 
change in patterns of  Latin American democracy. It is not by chance 
that claims for substantive participation have been reiterated by recent 
protests throughout the continent, as in Brazil, where millions of  people 
filled up the streets of  several cities in June 2013, expressing a clear 
discrediting of  parliamentary representatives and of  an unresponsive 
and corrupted political system.
Lessons from the crises of  leftist governments under new 
developmentalism must be learned in order to push back the full 
resumption of  neoliberal models, already on course in countries 
such as Brazil and Argentina. The struggles of  social movements 
for participation in decision-making processes, intended to ensure 
democratic deepening and truly new routes for development, should 
not be ignored. The challenge posed by the construction of  democratic 
new alliances between state and society cannot be ignored, therefore, 
amidst a reconfiguration of  the role of  the state as a ‘pro-development 
political conscious action’ that is aligning with a radical redefinition of  
the decision-making power of  society.
Notes
1 Civil society is understood here as the space occupied by organised 
sectors of  society, such as social movements, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and a multiplicity of  other organisations, 
whose common characteristic is the search for access to the 
public space in order to achieve their objectives. Civil society is 
characterised by its heterogeneity and by the competition between 
different interests and projects in conflict, being, therefore, a political 
space by definition (Dagnino 2011).
2 For both radical democratic and neoliberal notions of  participation, 
see Dagnino (2004) and Dagnino et al. (2006).
3 For a thorough survey of  participatory instances in Latin America, 
including a reading list, see Eng and Perron (2013), Citizen 
Participation in Latin America: Innovations to Strengthen Governance.
4 The emergence of  leftist governments in the continent began with 
the presidency of  Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1999–2013). The 
election of  Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003 launched the Workers’ 
Party governments: he was re-elected in 2006 and followed by Dilma 
Rousseff, who was elected in 2010 and again in 2014, and governed 
until 2016, when she was ousted from power. The peronista Nestor 
Kirchner governed Argentina from 2003 until his death and was 
succeeded by Cristina Kirchner (2007–15). In Uruguay, Tabaré 
Vasquez, candidate of  the Frente Amplio, was elected in 2005, 
succeeded in 2010 by Pepe Mujica and returned to the presidency in 
2015. Evo Morales and Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera, from 
the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to Socialism, MAS), have 
governed Bolivia since 2006, having been re-elected in 2009 and 
2015. Rafael Correa founded the movement Alianza PAIS (Patria 
Altiva y Soberana, Proud and Sovereign Patria) to run for presidential 
election in 2006, and is now in his third mandate as president 
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of  Ecuador. In Chile, the Socialist Party’s Michelle Bachelet was 
president from 2006 to 2010, and elected again in 2014.
5 In Ecuador, for example, the moderately radical initial establishment 
of  the Council of  Citizen Participation and Social Control, 
denominated the Fifth Power, has been undermined, according to 
Moscos (2014), by ‘executive intrusions’ and ‘hyper-presidentialism’.
6 In 2014, when the Brazilian government proposed the institution 
of  a National System of  Social Participation to the Congress that 
was intended to establish common rules for the different existing 
participatory institutions, there was a very strong reaction and it 
has been accused of  trying to install a Bolivarian Revolution in the 
country. Although the System was aimed at instituting participation 
as ‘a method of  government’ (Presidency of  the Republic 2014), 
President Dilma Rousseff never engaged herself  in assuring the 
political conditions for its approval. The Congress did not even put 
the proposal to a vote.
7 Bresser Pereira, curiously, was the minister of  state reform who, under 
the Cardoso government in the 1990s, led neoliberal state reform 
in 1995, the jewel of  the crown in the implementation of  the model 
in Brazil. Among other things, it regulated the ‘social organisations’ 
in charge of  the implementation of  targeted, and restricted social 
policies while lacking any decision-making power over them.
8 Vargas became a mythical figure in the Brazilian popular imaginary, 
known as the ‘Father of  the Poor’. In Dilma Rousseff’s first electoral 
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